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ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF
IMPLEMENTING THE HAGUE
ABDUCTION CONVENTION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND MEXICO
Breanna Atwood

I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2007, seventeen-month-old1 Andrew was abducted
to Mexico from his hometown of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.2 At the
time of his abduction, Andrew’s parents were involved in divorce
proceedings and had a temporary custody agreement granting

1
Sources differ as to whether Andrew was seventeen or nineteen
months old at the time of his abduction. Compare Trevor Richardson, My Journey
Continues
(Mar.
1,
2008),
http://mexicoabduction.blogspot.com/2008_03_01_archive.html (Trevor’s blog
stating that Andrew was seventeen months old at the time of his abduction), with
Trevor Richardson, Bring Andrew Home-Int’l Child Abduction to Mexico, YOUTUBE
(Sep.
7,
2010)
[hereinafter
Bring
Andrew
Home],
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bl_SJ1CVOdM (A news segment posted on
Trevor’s YouTube channel stating that Andrew was nineteen months old).
2
Felony Warrant For Mother Who Abducted Her Child, Andrew Richardson, In
The Summer Of 2007, MISSING & UNIDENTIFIED PEOPLE: LETS FIND THEM (Nov.
27, 2012), http://letsfindthem.wordpress.com/2012/11/27/unsolved-felonywarrant-for-mother-who-abduction-her-child-andrew-richardson-in-the-summerof-2007/.

2016

Atwood

5:2

Andrew’s father, Trevor, visitation.3 When Trevor arrived at
Andrew’s daycare to pick him up, he was informed that his son had
not shown up for a week.4 Andrew was soon found in Querétaro,
Mexico, living with his mother, Mariana,5 a Mexican national.6
Mariana was charged in the U.S. with two felonies for abduction,7
and Trevor was granted sole legal custody of Andrew.8 Upon
arriving in Mexico, however, Mariana had told authorities that she
fled the U.S. because Trevor was abusive to her and Andrew.9
Although the U.S. determined these allegations were false,10 Trevor
remains unable to secure the return of his son to the U.S. in
accordance with his custody rights.11
Sadly, Andrew and Trevor’s story is not uncommon. Each
year, more than one thousand international parental child abductions
from the U.S. to other countries are reported.12 Since 2006, Congress
has reported that this number has “increased substantially,”13 since
advancements in international transportation and communication
have resulted in an increase in travel and immigration.14 In fact, it is
estimated that more than 11,000 American children15 currently live
3
Trevor Richardson, History, BRING ANDREW HOME,
http://www.bringandrewhome.com/andrew_feb_7_002.htm (last visited Jan. 25,
2014).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Bring Andrew Home, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
My Journey Continues, supra note 1.
9
Bring Andrew Home, supra note 1.
10
Id.
11
My Journey Continues, supra note 1.
12
H.R. 3212, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/3212/text.
13
H.R. 1951, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), available at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1951/text; see also H.R. 3240,
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/F?c111:1:./temp/~c111TqDdHb:e1569: (stating that the number of
international parental child abductions increased by sixty percent from 2006 to
2008, and by forty percent in 2008 alone).
14
Priscilla Steward, Access Rights: A Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 308, 315 (1997).
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abroad as a result of international parental child abduction.16
Statistically, only half of these children will be returned to the U.S.17
International parental child abduction frequently causes
severe psychological and emotional damage to both the child and
left-behind parent.18 Often, the child is taken from a stable, healthy
environment, and relocated to an unfamiliar environment in which he
or she must meet new people, learn a new language, and understand
and assimilate into a different culture.19 Worse still, taking parents
sometimes force their children to alter their appearance or change
their name,20 and may tell their children the left-behind parent is
dead, does not want them, or is not trying to get them back. 21
Abducted children often experience “anxiety, eating problems,
nightmares, mood swings, sleep disturbances, aggressive behavior,
resentment, and fearfulness,” and these problems may persist
through adulthood.22

Another source estimated that there are more than 200,000 cases of
international child abduction per year, which would significantly increase the
number of American children who are believed to be living abroad as a result of
international parental child abduction. A Parent’s Worst Nightmare: The Heartbreak of
Int’l Child Abduction: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 110
(2004) (statement of the Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Board, National
Center
for
Missing
&
Exploited
Children),
available
at
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94505.000/hfa94505_0f.htm.
16
Michael Walsh & Susan Savard, Int’l Child Abduction and the Hague
Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 29 (2006).
17
H.R. 3212, supra note 12.
18
U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 10 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Compliance
Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2010Co
mplianceReport.pdf.
19
Caitlin Bannon, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction: The Need for Mechanisms to Address Noncompliance, 31 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 129, 134 (2011).
20
U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 7 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Compliance Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2009Ha
gueAbductionConventionComplianceReport.pdf.
21
Id.
15
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Similarly, left-behind parents frequently experience
psychological, emotional, and financial problems while attempting to
secure the return of their children.23 Left-behind parents often feel
“helplessness and the sense they do not know where to start in the
process of recovering their child.”24 A lack of financial resources
exacerbates these emotions, since the left-behind parent may be
restricted in traveling abroad, retaining an attorney, hiring translators
and interpreters, and proceeding with the case.25
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention” or the “Convention”)
was enacted to ensure that victims of international parental child
abduction are returned to their custodial parent.26 The text of the
Convention, however, does not set forth standards or procedures to
implement the Convention.27 Consequently, many countries have
failed to comply because of internal difficulties with enforcement.28
This comment will examine the problem of noncompliance,
with a focus on children abducted between the U.S. and Mexico.
Part II provides a general overview of the Convention and examines
its objectives and operation between contracting states. Part III
assesses the problems of the Convention, particularly its lack of an
enforcement mechanism. Part IV describes the differences between
the U.S. and Mexico’s legal systems, with an emphasis on custody
rights. Part V explains the history of the Convention in the U.S. and
Mexico, focuses on each country’s compliance efforts, and provides
an overview of recent compliance efforts in Latin America. Finally,
Part VI explores potential solutions for addressing noncompliance,
including creating Hague Convention courts and providing adequate
resources to left-behind parents and Central Authorities.
Id.
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 11.
24
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 7.
25
Id.
26
The Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, opened
for signature Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Abduction Convention],
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24.
27
Elisa Perez-Vera, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, Explanatory
Report 430 (1981) [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report], available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf.
28
Bannon, supra note 19, at 153.
22
23
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II. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
On October 24, 1980, twenty-nine Member States of the
Hague Conference unanimously adopted the Convention, which was
signed the following day.29 Currently, more than eighty countries are
party to the Convention, including the U.S. and Mexico.30 The
Convention’s primary goal is for countries to work together to
“protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their
wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure
their prompt return to the State of habitual residence31.”32 The
Convention also seeks to ensure that rights of custody and access are
returned to the “status quo” that existed before the child was
abducted.33 Finally, the Convention seeks to deter abducting parents
from engaging in international forum shopping to find a country in
which they believe they can obtain a favorable custody agreement.34
A. Objectives of the Hague Convention
The Hague Convention states two primary objectives:35 (1)
“to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or
retained in any Contracting State,”36 and (2) “to ensure that rights of
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 426.
Members of the Organisation, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24
(last
visited
Jan.
26,
2014),
now
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing.
31
Neither the Hague Convention nor ICARA define a child’s state of
habitual residence. In Abbott, however, the Supreme Court explained that a child’s
state of habitual residence is “fixed by the custody arrangement,” so the child
should be returned to the country of his or her custodial parent. Abbott v. Abbott,
560 U.S. 1, 33 (2010).
32
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at Preamble.
33
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429.
34
Id.; Walsh & Savard, supra note 16, at 30.
35
Both of the Convention’s objectives assume that the return of the
child to the state of habitual residence is in his or her best interest. Although the
Convention does not explicitly refer to the child’s best interest, contracting states
consider them to be of utmost importance when determining custody and access
rights. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 431.
29
30
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custody and access under the law of one Contracting State are
effectively represented in the other Contracting States.”37 A taking
parent’s duty to return a child is triggered only when the child’s
removal or retention is deemed wrongful under the Convention.38
Removal or retention is considered wrongful where it is (1) in breach
of custody rights in the state in which the child was habitually
resident immediately prior to his or her removal or retention, and (2)
when the left-behind parent was actually exercising those custody
rights at the time of the removal or retention.39
The Convention defines custody rights as “relating to the care
of . . . the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s
place of residence.”40 Custody rights differ from access rights, which
are the “rights to take a child for a limited period of time to a place
other than the child’s habitual residence.”41 Custody rights may arise
by law, or by a judicial or administrative decision or agreement that
has legal effect under the law of the child’s state of habitual
residence.42
B. The Role of the Central Authority
To execute the mandates of the Hague Convention,
contracting states are required to assign a Central Authority.43 The
primary role of the Central Authority is to return abducted children
by encouraging cooperation between officials in each state and
among other contracting states.44 In addition, Central Authorities
must assist in locating the child, attempt to facilitate a voluntary
return of the child, and, if necessary, initiate legal proceedings for the

A contracting state is “any country which is a party to the
Convention.” 22 C.F.R. § 94.1 (2013).
37
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 1.
38
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 444.
39
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 3.
40
Id. at art. 5(a).
41
Id. at art. 5(b).
42
Id. at art. 3.
43
Id. at art. 6.
44
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 7.
36
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child’s return.45 In the U.S., the designated Central Authority is the
Office of Children’s Issues within the U.S. Department of State.46 In
Mexico, the Central Authority is the Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores.47
C. Filing a Hague Convention Application
For assistance in returning an abducted child, left-behind
parents who believe their child has been wrongfully removed or
retained must apply to a Central Authority.48 The Central Authority
then must act “without delay” to transmit the application to its
pertinent counterpart Central Authority,49 which must “take[] all
appropriate measures” to locate the child and secure his or her
prompt return.50
A left-behind parent must satisfy three threshold
requirements before filing a valid Hague Convention application.
First, the child’s country of habitual residence and country of
abduction must both be signatories to the Convention.51 Second, the
child must have been removed from the state of habitual residence in
breach of custody or access rights authorized in that state.52 Third,
the child must be younger than sixteen years of age.53 Even if the
child is abducted or an application for the child’s return is initiated

45
Id.; Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, HAGUE CONF. ON
PRIVATE INT’L LAW (July 2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf.
46
Authorities, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=133 (last visited
Jan. 26, 2014).
47
Int’l Parental Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/mexico.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2014).
48
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 8; Perez-Vera Report,
supra note 27, at 455 (stating that the applicant may apply to whichever Central
Authority it deems most appropriate).
49
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 9.
50
Id. at art. 10.
51
Id. at art. 35.
52
Id. at art. 3.
53
Id. at art. 4.
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before the child turns sixteen years old, the Convention ceases to
apply as soon as the child reaches this age.54
If all three requirements are satisfied and the child is
successfully located, the appropriate Central Authority must assist the
left-behind parent to initiate court proceedings in the country in
which the child is located.55 In these proceedings, the court should
not consider the merits of the underlying custody dispute.56 Instead,
the court’s sole focus is to determine whether the child was
wrongfully removed according to custody rights in the child’s state of
habitual residence and to return those children it determines to have
been wrongfully removed.57 If the parents desire to modify their
custody agreement, they must contact the appropriate authorities in
the child’s state of habitual residence once the child has been
returned.58
D. Defenses to the Hague Convention
To protect the child’s best interests, the Hague Convention
does not require the prompt return of abducted children under five
circumstances.59 First, there is no obligation to return a child if more
than one year has elapsed from when the child was wrongfully
removed or retained to when the left-behind parent made a request
for the child’s return, as long as the child has settled in to his or her
new environment.60 Second, there is no duty to return a child if the
parent with custodial rights was not exercising those rights at the time
of the child’s removal or retention.61 Third, if the left-behind parent
consented or acquiesced in the child’s removal or retention, the
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 4.
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 455.
56
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 16-19.
57
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429.
58
Id. at 430.
59
The first three defenses listed must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence, and the last two must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Nat’l
Report
Int’l
Child
Custody,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/International_Child_Abducti
on_Remedies_Act.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
60
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 12.
61
Id. at art. 13(a).
54
55
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taking parent is not required to return the child.62 Fourth, there is no
obligation to return a child if the abducting country determines that
doing so would pose a “grave risk” or place the child in an otherwise
“intolerable situation.”63 Finally, a taking parent is not required to
return a child if doing so would go against the requesting state’s
fundamental principles relating to the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.64
III. PROBLEMS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Prior to the Hague Convention, a left-behind parent would
have little to no legal remedy to ensure his or her child’s rightful
return.65 The Department of State could not enforce an American
custody agreement outside of the U.S.,66 since custody rights
authorized in the U.S. could not be enforced in other countries.67 In
addition, courts in the U.S. were reluctant to enforce a left-behind
parent’s custody rights, since the abducted child was no longer
located within the U.S.68
The Convention has not achieved its laudable goals. The
Convention was designed to ensure that wrongfully removed children
would be returned in accordance with custody rights ordered in the
child’s state of habitual residence (and effectively return the situation

Id.
Id. at art. 13(b).
64
Id. at art. 20.
65
Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence
in Int’l Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325,
3332-33 (2009); see also Susan Mackie, Procedural Problems in the Adjudication of Int’l
Parental child Abduction Cases, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 445, 448 (1996) (stating
that before the Convention, taking parents would obtain a favorable custody
agreement in the abducting country, precluding the left-behind parent from
establishing his or her custody rights).
66
Int’l Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 1995), available at
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/population/children/9501.html.
67
Vivatvaraphol, supra note 65, at 3332.
68
Id.
62
63
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to the “status quo”69); however, the Convention is not performing as
it was originally intended.70
The Convention’s primary issue is that its text does not
contain an enforcement mechanism for “ensuring that Contracting
States fulfill their obligations or for dealing with those Contracting
States that fail to do so.”71 As a result, enforcement of the
Convention hinges solely on the cooperation and willingness of
contracting states.72 If contracting states do not comply, there are no
consequences or repercussions.73 Left-behind parents report that
even when their children are abducted to countries that are
signatories to the Convention, most of these countries “routinely
reject the responsibility that comes with participation in [the
Convention]” and the U.S. “fail[s] to respond to their pleas for
help.”74
As a result of the lack of an enforcement mechanism,
numerous parties to the Convention are considered noncompliant.75
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA),76 enacted
in the U.S. to enforce the Convention, requires the Department of
State to release an annual compliance report.77 Reports include
detailed country-by-country international child abduction statistics,
summaries of unresolved cases, address issues contracting states are
having with compliance, and describe efforts to encourage parties to
the Convention to use nongovernmental organizations to assist leftbehind parents seeking the return of their children.78 Compliance

69
70

Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429.
Bannon, supra note 19, at 153.

Id.
Id. (quoting Paul R. Beaumont & Peter E. McEleavy, The Hague
Convention on Int’l Child Abduction 242 (P.B. Carter ed., 1999).
73
Id.
74
H.R. Con. Res. 293, 106th Cong. (2000).
75
Bannon, supra note 19, at 153.
76
See discussion infra, at Part V.B.
77
42 U.S.C. § 11611(a) (1988).
78
Id.
71
72
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reports also list all countries the Department of State determines are
having difficulties enforcing the Convention.79
When evaluating a contracting state’s compliance, the
Department of State evaluates three areas: Central Authority
performance, judicial performance, and law enforcement
performance.80 First, the Department of State evaluates how quickly
a country’s Central Authority processes Convention applications, its
willingness to help left-behind parents find competent legal
assistance, and its responsiveness to inquiries made by the U.S.
Central Authority (USCA) and left-behind parents.81 Next, the
Department evaluates judicial performance, including how quickly
the country’s courts process Convention applications and appeals,
whether the courts correctly apply the Convention’s legal procedures,
and how effective courts are in enforcing decisions.82 Finally, the
Department reviews law enforcement performance by examining
whether law enforcement officials are successful in expeditiously
locating abducted children and taking parents, and enforcing court
orders issued under the Convention.83
Based on contracting states’ performance, they may be
labeled by the Department of State as either “Countries Not
Compliant with the Convention” or “Countries Demonstrating
Patterns of Noncompliance with the Convention.”84 A “Countr[y]
Not Compliant with the Convention” designation signals the country
is not competent in all performance areas.85
A “Countr[y]
Demonstrating Patterns of Noncompliance” designation indicates
the country is not competent in one or two of the three performance

79
80

Id.
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 6.

Id. at 12.
Id.
83
Id.
84
U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliant with the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 6 (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Compliance Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2008Ha
gueAbductionConventionComplianceReport.pdf.
85
Id.
81
82

800

2016

Atwood

5:2

areas.86 Mexico has earned both of these designations in recent
years.87 In addition, a country is considered compliant if it is
competent in all three areas, although the Department of State
considers even one unresolved case to possibly “reflect broader
problems of concern with the country’s compliance.”88
IV. DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE
U.S.
Mexico and the U.S. possess different legal systems, and
different philosophies regarding custody and parental rights.89 In
deciding Hague Convention return cases, the law of the child’s state
of habitual residence governs the validity of the claim.90 This law
must be construed broadly to “embrac[e] both written and customary
rules of law91 . . . and the interpretations placed upon them by caselaw.”92 This has led to misunderstandings in enforcing custody
agreements, and makes it difficult for the U.S. and Mexico to
uniformly enforce the Hague Convention. Ultimately, this conflict
contributes to the Department of State’s determination that Mexico
is noncompliant.93

Id.
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 15 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Compliance
Report],
available
at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2007chil
d_abduction_Compliance_Report.pdf; 2008 Compliance Report, supra note 83, at 16;
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21; 2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at
22.
88
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 15.
89
Mexico’s legal system derives from civil law, so judges look primarily
at the Code when deciding legal issues. The U.S.’ legal system derives from
common law, so judges decide legal issues based on statutes and precedent.
Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, U.S./Mexico Cross-Border Child Abduction – the Need for
Cooperation, 29 N.M. L. REV. 289, 294 (1999).
90
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 445.
91
An example of a customary rule of law is the concept of patria
potestas in Mexico. See discussion infra, at Part IV.A.
92
Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 445.
93
2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 22.
86
87
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A. Custody Rights in Mexico
In Mexico, the concept of patria potestad,94 translated to
parental authority, is applied to the legal relationship between
children and their parents.95 Exercising parental authority involves a
duty of care and custody to the minor child.96 As Mexican courts
apply this concept, custody of a child involves special care, attention,
and love.97 Further, “[c]ustody cannot be understood separately from
the physical supervision of the children, because that connection is a
means to protect them, raise them . . . and provide for them.”98
Parental authority is distinct from the physical custody of a child or
an arrangement of visitation rights, however, because parental
authority is inherent in the relationship between children and their
parents.99
Historically, parental authority referred to paternal power, so
“a father had a near absolute right to his children, whom he viewed
as chattel.”100 This natural right was viewed as so strong that courts
were virtually “powerless” to interfere.101 Over time, however,
Mexican courts began to subordinate the concept of parental
authority to the best interests of the child.102
Today, parental authority in Mexico is largely governed by the
Civil Code,103 and “has evolved from an absolute power into a legal
power.”104 Parental authority has slowly transformed into a joint
94
“Patria potestad” is Spanish for “parental authority.” Patricia Begné,
Symposium on Comparative Custody Law: North American Parental Authority and Child
Custody in Mexico, 39 FAM. L.Q. 527, 527 (2005).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 533.
97
Id. at 534.

Id.
Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 453 (1st Cir. 2000).
100
Kathryn Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making – How
Judges use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 14 (1998).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 16.
103
JOSÉ ANTONIO MÁRQUEZ GONZÁLEZ, FAMILY LAW IN MEXICO 80
(Kluwer Law Int’l 2011).
104
Begné, supra note 94, at 528.
98
99
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responsibility between the father and mother.105 In divorce cases,
both parents continue to exercise parental authority over the child,106
unless this authority is legally terminated.107 Since Mexican family law
courts are instructed to consider the best interests of the child in
deciding custody arrangements,108 children are commonly placed with
their mothers following a divorce.109 Only one to five of every one
hundred fathers are awarded custody of their children.110 In fact,
mothers are automatically awarded custody of children under age
seven (and sometimes up to age twelve, depending on the state),
unless the father proves that the mother poses a significant danger to
the child’s development.111
B. Custody Rights in the U.S.
Similar to Mexico, the U.S. historically awarded custody rights
to fathers, since children were considered the father’s property.112 In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, states increasingly awarded
custody based on the best interests of the child.113 As a result,
mothers were often awarded custody of their children, especially in
the case of young children.114
Recently, the “maternal presumption” has lessened, and the
legislature considers joint custody and uses a primary caretaker
standard to determine the child’s best interests.115 Joint custody
assumes that allowing a child to maintain relationships with both
Sedillo Lopez, supra note 89, at 297.
Id.
107
Allison Maxim, Int’l Parental Child Abduction: Essential Principles of the
Hague Convention, 69 APR BENCH & B. MINN. 18, 20 (Apr. 2012).
108
Begné, supra note 94, at 539.
109
Sedillo Lopez, supra note 89, at 298.
110
Aline Juárez Nieto, Patria Potestad, Donde la Biología Juega en Contra de
los
Varones,
CNN
MEXICO
(July
11,
2012,
3:32
PM),
http://mexico.cnn.com/salud/2012/07/11/patria-potestad-donde-la-biologiajuega-en-contra-de-los-varones.
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parents is in the child’s best interests.116 The primary caretaker
standard presumes that it is in the child’s best interest to live with
whichever parent has provided continuous care.117
Despite
movements toward these new standards, mothers are still awarded
custody of their children more frequently than fathers.118 For
example, in 2012, only 18.3 percent of custodial parents were
fathers.119
V. HISTORY OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
MEXICO
Mexico is the most popular destination for children abducted
from the U.S., and vice versa.120 For example, in 2009, the USCA
was involved with 558 cases in which American children were
abducted to Mexico.121 Japan had the second largest number of
active cases with thirty-eight.122 This phenomenon likely results from
Mexico’s proximity to, and historical and cultural connections with,
the U.S.123 Today, there are roughly 11.7 million individuals living in
the U.S. who were born in Mexico, and Mexico-U.S. migration is the
largest bi-national migration flow in the world.124
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A. Mexico’s Compliance with the Hague Convention
In recent years, the Department of State has found that
Mexico has struggled to fulfill its obligations under the Hague
Convention.125 For three consecutive years, Mexico was designated
as a country exhibiting “patterns of noncompliance” because the
Mexican Central Authority (MCA) was ineffective at locating
abducted children and taking parents within Mexico.126 For example,
in 2009, there were forty-seven cases of children abducted from the
U.S. to Mexico, and the children were only located in thirteen of
these cases.127
In 2010, Mexico was labeled as “not compliant.”128 The
USCA reported it “experienced serious difficulties” working with the
MCA, causing left-behind parents to endure “costly inconvenience”
and “significant delays” in processing return applications.129 For
example, the USCA requested the MCA’s assistance in locating
children involved in thirty-eight unresolved cases that had been
pending for more than eighteen months, but the MCA failed to
locate them “[i]n many of the cases.”130
Three factors contribute to Mexico’s difficulties enforcing the
Hague Convention. First, Mexico has not enacted legislation, like
ICARA in the U.S., to effectively implement the Convention.131
Instead, this responsibility is reserved to the states.132 As a result,
Congress unanimously adopted a resolution urging Mexico and other
noncompliant countries “to ensure their compliance with the Hague
125
See 2007 Compliance Report, supra note 87, at 15; 2008 Compliance Report,
supra note 84, at 16; 2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21; 2010 Compliance
Report, supra note 18, at 22.
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See 2007 Compliance Report, supra note 87, at 15; 2008 Compliance Report,
supra note 84, at 16; 2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21.
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Convention by enacting effective implementing legislation and
educating their judicial and law enforcement authorities.”133 Mexico,
however, continues to enforce the Convention according to
independent state law.134
Second, Mexico does not have sufficient resources to locate
abducted children and taking parents, or to educate officials and
judges about the Convention’s procedures.135 For example, some
Mexican judges continue to adjudicate cases arising under the
Convention based on procedures found in state civil codes136 and the
merits of the underlying custody dispute, which is inconsistent with
the Convention.137 Instead, judges are supposed to assume the
existing custody agreement from the child’s state of habitual
residence is valid, and must return the child based on this
agreement.138 Recently, Congress encouraged Mexico and other
noncompliant countries to “further educate its central authority and
local law enforcement authorities regarding the Hague
Convention . . . and the need for immediate action when a parent of
an abducted child seeks their assistance.”139
Third, taking parents may file an “amparo,” a special appeal in
which the taking parent claims that the government has violated a
constitutional right.140 When an amparo is filed, the case is put on
hold until a ruling on the amparo has been made.141 A ruling on an
amparo may be appealed multiple times, resulting in costly delays to
the left-behind parent.142
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In an attempt to solve these problems, in 2008, the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City began working with the MCA “to persuade
the Mexican branch of Interpol to apply more resources and effort to
locate abducted children, and to educate the judiciary in an effort to
increase understanding of the Convention.”143 Further, the MCA
began working with the Agencia Federal de Investigación (AFI) in an
effort to more efficiently locate abducted children.144 Finally, the
MCA has also claimed that it has undertaken legislative initiatives to
restrict the use of amparos in Hague return cases.145
For the past three years, the Department of State has noted
the MCA has made significant improvements in its enforcement of
the Convention.146 Unfortunately, the MCA and Mexican law
enforcement continue to experience difficulties locating abducted
children because of inadequate staffing and other resources. 147
Mexican courts are also exceptionally slow in processing Hague
return applications,148 and judges continue to adjudicate Hague return
cases inconsistently.149 As a result, the number of unresolved return
applications is increasing.150
B. The U.S.’ Compliance with the Hague Convention
Congress enacted ICARA to give effect to the Hague
Convention in the U.S.151 The Act gives the Convention the force of
law in the U.S., and imposes consequences, such as contempt, if the
Convention is not complied with.152 ICARA and the Convention
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serve “to deter international child abduction and to provide a
mechanism for the prompt return of abducted children.”153
Parts of ICARA, however, hinder operation of the
Convention. For example, ICARA grants state and federal courts
concurrent jurisdiction over all claims arising under the
Convention.154 It is recommended that Hague Convention return
cases be filed in federal court because “[f]ederal judges are
considered . . . better equipped to [rule according to the Convention]
as opposed to state court judges, who are accustomed to making best
interests of the child determinations and who may be more inclined
to do so in Hague Convention cases.”155 Consequently, a left-behind
parent may engage in forum-shopping to obtain the most favorable
venue to pursue his or her Hague return case, resulting in additional
costs and delays.156
The Department of States’ three most recent compliance
reports do not include statistics analyzing the U.S.’ handling of
incoming Hague Convention cases.157 Nonetheless, in 2009, there
were 324 newly filed Convention applications involving 454 children
that were abducted into the U.S.158 Of these 454 children, the U.S.
only returned 154 of them to their country of habitual residence.159
120 of these children were abducted from Mexico, and only fiftythree were returned.160 Although the U.S. does not evaluate its own
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performance, these numbers suggest that, despite ICARA, the U.S.
also experiences difficulties enforcing the Convention.
C. Latin American Efforts to Promote Compliance with the
Hague Convention
In 2004, judges and Central Authorities from seventeen Latin
American countries, Spain, and the U.S. met to discuss ways to
improve regional operation of the Hague Convention.161 Officials
concluded that cooperation with the Convention would require
“[r]egular international meetings and contacts among Judges and
Central Authorities for the purpose of exchanging information, ideas
and good practice.”162 At follow-up meetings, officials recommended
and developed “regional model law of procedure” to “facilitate
national implementation of the [Convention].”163
In 2011, officials from Latin American countries and
organizations, Spain, and the U.S. met “to discuss how to improve,
among the countries represented, the operation of the
[Convention] . . . and to provide information on the implementation
of the [Convention].”164 The meeting proposed to develop a
“practical handbook” to assist judges in Hague proceedings,
recommended limiting grounds for appeals to streamline
proceedings, and emphasized the importance of communication
between Central Authorities and judges.165 In theory, educating all
161
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Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, available
at http://www.hcch.net/upload/monterrey2.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
162
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personnel, and attorneys. Id.
163
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164
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judges in every contracting state and encouraging communication
between Central Authorities is a viable solution. Streamlining these
efforts and providing resources to facilitate the return of children will
best serve the Convention’s goals.
VI. SOLUTIONS FOR ADDRESSING NONCOMPLIANCE BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND MEXICO
Compliance with the Hague Convention is critical for
protecting abducted children.166 The Convention is often considered
a “one-way street” for Americans.167 Left-behind parents from
noncompliant countries benefit from the “almost certain” guarantee
that children abducted into the U.S. will be returned, while American
parents lack these same guarantees.168 In truth, the U.S. also has a
meager track record for returning children. Consequently, the
Convention remains an empty promise for many left-behind parents.
The U.S. and Mexico (and other contracting states) must ensure that
abducted children are promptly returned to their custodial parent.
A. Educating Judges About Hague Return Cases
Despite efforts to educate judges about Hague return cases,
these cases are often decided inconsistently within a country and
between countries.169 Judges are told to rule based on a broad
interpretation of law, which includes the customary laws of the
child’s state of habitual residence.170 Many judges also determine
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family law issues according to the best interests of the child, but this
may be inconsistent with the existing custody agreement.171
Educating each judge in the U.S. and Mexico about the
Hague Convention is a daunting task, particularly because many of
these judges will never be assigned a Hague return case. Ideally,
providing a dedicated group of judges or courts would alleviate the
problems associated with an inconsistent judiciary. In the U.S.,
Congress may use its Article I powers “[t]o constitute tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court.”172 In Mexico, each state’s Congress
has the power to create federal administrative courts.173 A court
dedicated to Hague return cases would allow judges to become
intimately familiar with the Convention and case law from other
countries.174 As a result, Hague Convention return cases would be
adjudicated consistently with the objectives of the Convention.
B. Providing Adequate Financial Resources to Left-Behind Parents
The U.S. does not provide adequate resources to left-behind
parents. The U.S. made a reservation175 to Article 26 of the Hague
Convention. Although making a reservation to Article 26 has not
posed significant problems to other countries, it is a major source of
delays in the U.S.176 The U.S. places the burden of paying for legal
proceedings and attorneys solely on the left-behind parent, unless
Silberman, supra note 168, at 1057.
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I, § 8, cl. 9.
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these costs are covered by legal aid or assumed by pro bono
attorneys.177 The legal aid system in the U.S., however, is underfunded,178 and the availability of pro bono attorneys is decreasing,
especially for family law-related claims.179
The expenses of a Hague Convention return case extend
beyond the legal proceedings.180 Despite the U.S. legal aid system’s
lack of funds, the U.S. should be required to assist indigent leftbehind parents in these proceedings, since this benefits the abducted
child and minimizes the time the child spends in an unfamiliar
environment.
The United Kingdom, for example, has been
successful in requiring its legal aid system to cover all legal costs to
the extent it can bear.181 The U.S. could also require taking parents to
cover the left-behind parents’ legal expenses, but this may not be
feasible depending on the taking parent’s financial situation.
C. Providing Adequate Resources to Central Authorities
Mexico does not provide adequate resources to the MCA to
locate abducted children and taking parents.182 Although the MCA
works with Interpol and AFI, the Authority still lacks the manpower
and funds necessary to be effective, especially when the left-behind
parent does not know the child’s exact location.183 Mexico’s lack of
resources makes cooperation with the U.S. paramount.
The USCA should limit using its resources to educate
Mexican judges, the MCA, and law enforcement on Hague return
cases. Although the Department of State has noted recent
improvements,184 the bulk of the MCA’s problems no longer result
Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at Art. 26.
Mackie, supra note 65, at 455.
179
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180
For example, left-behind parents often must pay to locate the child,
travel to the country the child is located in, and travel home. The left-behind
parent may also miss work, and the taking parent may stop making child support or
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from a lack of information. Instead, the USCA should expend its
resources in the form of manpower to assist the MCA and Mexican
law enforcement in locating abducted children in Mexico.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Hague Convention lacks an enforcement mechanism to
ensure that abducted children are promptly returned. In many
countries, the Convention is an empty promise for left-behind
parents. Although the U.S. enacted ICARA to implement the
Convention, the U.S. has an unacceptable track record in returning
abducted children. The U.S. and Mexico must work together to
ensure that children are promptly located and returned.
Consequently, the U.S. and Mexico should create courts with judges
dedicated to Hague Convention return cases to ensure consistency
and accuracy in decisions. The U.S. must provide financial assistance
to left-behind parents, and Mexico and the U.S. must provide
resources to the MCA to locate abducted children and taking parents.
Under the current framework, the Convention fails to protect
thousands of children and families every year. We can do better.
Our children deserve better.
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